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RECENT DECISIONS
however, that the decision does not go beyond the scope of the doctrine as it
existed heretofore, butrather serves to clarify the nature of last clear chance.
Alvin M. Glick
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - IMPLIED WARRANTY "CON-
TRACT" ACTION HELD BARRED BY INJURY TO
PROPERTY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
More than three years after plaintiff's dwelling house had been levelled
by an explosion of waterproofing material he had purchased from the defen-
dant, the plaintiff brought this action for damages for injury to his property.
The complaint contained two causes of action, one of which was framed in
contract and predicated on a breach of warranty theory. The motion to dismiss
set up the three year statute of limitations applicable to- actions for damages
for injury to property, New York Civ. Prac. Act S 49(7). The plaintiff in op-
position to this motion, contended that the six year statute applying to contract
actions should govern. N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 48(1). Held: An action for con-
sequential damages to property, whether the action is brought in contract or
in tort, is an action for injury to property within the three year statute of limi-
tations. Motion of defendant granted. Buyers v. Buffalo Paint & Specialties,
Inc.,99 N. Y. S. 2d 713 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1950).
By Chapter 588 of the Laws of 1936 § 48 and 49 were amended, subd. 7
being added to S 49, cutting down the applicable period of limitations fo"
actions for damages for injury to property from six to three years. Section 49
in part states: "The following actions must be commenced within three years
after the cause of action has accrued... (7) An action to recover damages for
an injury to property, except in the case where a different period is expressly
prescribed in this article . . ." It will be noted that this statute does not draw
a distinction in terms between actions in tort and actions in contract.
Warranty actions are commonly cast in the form of an action in-contract.
There must be privity of contract in an action for breach of warranty. Ryan v.
Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N. Y. 388, 175 N. E. 105, 74 A. L. R. 339
(1931). The negligence of the defendant is immaterial. Rinaldi v. Mohican
Co., 171 App. Div. 814, 157 N. Y. S. 561 (3d Dept. 1916), aff'd, 225 N. Y. 70,
121 N. E. 471 (1918). General Construction Law § 25-a states: "Injury to
property is an actionable act, whereby the estate of another is lessened, other
than a personal injury or the breach of contract." Injury to property refers to
actions grounded in tort, such as trespass or waste. Confreda v. George H.
Flinn Corp., 68 N. Y. S. 2d 925 (Sup. Ct. 1947). The definition of injury to
property, S 25-a, is applicable to the Civil Practice Act. General Construction
Law, S I10, Report of Joint Legislative Committee, 34 (1919). But cf.
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Schiavone-Bonomo v. Buffalo Barge Towing Corp., 132 F. 2d 766 (2d Cir.
1942), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 649, 64 S. Ct. 53, 88 L. Ed. 445 (1943), holding
that the General Construction Law has not applied to the Civil Practice Act
since 1920.
The court in the case at bar reasons that the exclusionary words, contained
in § 25-a, must be read as referable to actionable wrongs which constitute
solely breaches of contract and which do not have any tortious aspects. Since
plaintiff seeks consequential damages the action sounds in tort. Buyers v. Buf-
falo Paint & Specialties, Inc., supra. "Even today, an action for breach of war-
ranty is, in some respects, an action in tort," but "the distinction between torts
and breaches of contract is oft-times so dim and shadowy that no clear line of
delineation may be observed." Greco v. S. S. Kresge Co., 277 N. Y. 36, 12 N. E.
2d 557, 115 A. L. R. 1020 (1938). Support for the court's utilization of such
a fine distinction may be found in legislative policy. Although fraught with in-
consistencies, the prevailing polity has been the reduction in time within which
causes of action must be brought. .Cognizant of this policy, the court in the
case at bar applied the shorter of the two applicable periods of limitation.
Moreover the decision is supported by the method of interpretation adopted in
New York; that is, in applying the statute of limitations the form of the com-
plaint, whether ex contractu or ex delictu, is immaterial, the character of the
loss being determinative. Webber v. Herkimer & Mohawk St. R. R., 109 N. Y.
311, 16 N. E. 358 (1888), cited as controlling in Loehr v. East Side Omnibus
Corp., 259 App. Div. 200, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 529 (1st Dept. 1940), aff'd, 287 N.Y.
670, 39 N. E. 2d 290 (1941).
Although not presented in the case, an important problem suggested by
the facts is the time when the cause of action accrues. An action for breach of
warranty is generally deemed to have accrued upon the date of sale, and the
action is barred six years from that date. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sheila
Lynn, Inc., 185 Misc. 689, 57 N. Y. S 2d 707 (1st Dept. 1945), aff'd, 270 App.
Div. 835, 61 N. Y. S. 2d 373 (1st Dept. 1946). In the principal case, the
source of the action is breach of warranty, but because of the consequential
damages the action is said to sound in tort; therefore the three year period of
limitations is applicable. It might be argued that because of the source of the
action the limitation period begins running from the date of the sale and is
barred three years from that date. This, however, would be wholly inconsistent
with the court's applying § 49(7) to the action, because in determining the ap-
plicable period of limitations the court disregards the source of the action and
makes the damages sustained the predominant test. Yet in determining the
accrual of the cause of action the court, according to this theory, would have
to reverse itself, disregard the damages sustained and make the source of the
action the determining factor.
A second theory might be that the cause of action does not accrue until the
damages are sustained. Under such a theory, injury to property would be the
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-predominant test in determining the applicable period of limitations and the
date of accrual of the cause of action, thus satisfying the demands of con-
sistency and also preventing a party from finding himself in the position of
having his action barred before he knows of the breach. However in New
York the liability of the wroug, for breach of warranty, arises on the date
of sale, Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sheila Lynn, Inc., supra, and "except in
cases of fraud where the statute expressly provides otherwise, the statutory
period of limitations begins to run from the time when liability for the wrong
has arisen even though the injured party may be ignorant of the existence of
the wrong or injury." Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Trans. Co., 270 N. Y.
287, 200 N. E. 824, 104 A. L. R. 450 (1936).
Finally, a third theory might be that, since the action has a dual aspect,
suit must be brought within six years from the date of sale or three years from
the date of injury whichever is the shorter of the two periods.
John G. Wick
LABOR LAW - DISCRIMINATION BY UNION SEEKING UNION
SHOP ON BASIS OF SEX HELD "UNREASONABLE"
Defendant unions picketed plaintiff's tavern to induce acceptance of a
union shop. Plaintiff was willing to comply, and her employees were willing to
join the unions. But three of plaintiff's bartenders were women and the bar-
tenders' union strict policy was to admit only male bartenders to member-
ship. Thus, compliance with the union's demand would require plaintiff to
discharge, or at least take from behind the bar, the three barmaids. Held: in-
junction restraining picketing of plaintiff's establishment granted, "unless the
defendant unions agree, in the alternative, either to admit the barmaids pres-
ently employed by the plaintiff . . ., or to modify their demand for a union
shop, so as to exempt the barmaids now employed by the plaintiff from the
requirement that all the plaintiff's employees be or become members of de--
fendant unions." Wilsonv. Hacker, 101 N.Y. S. 2d 461 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
It has become well established during the past two decades that at least
in respect to employees at the time the union contract is entered into, a union
cannot demand a closed shop while at the same time maintaining an arbitrarily
closed union. Clarkv. Curtis, 273 App. Div. 797, 76 N. Y. S. 2d 3 (1947). The
principle has been justified in various ways, the first of these theories being
that of a principal-agent relationship. A union is required to act as exclusive
bargaining agent for all the employees in a given bargaining unit [see N. Y.
Labor Law § 705(1) and N. L. R. A. § 9a] and therefore must represent each
employee fairly and impartially. Any arbitrary conduct or discrimination on
the part of the union which would deprive any of the employees who are will-
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